Discussions and Reviews : Toward an ethology of human conflict: a review by Driver, Peter
Discussions and Reviews
Toward an ethology of human conflict:
a review
Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression
London: Methuen, 1966. Pp. 306. $5.75.
Robert Ardrey, African Genesis
New York: Atheneum, 1961. Pp. 380. $6.95.
Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative
New York: Atheneum, 1966. Pp. 390. $6.95.
Claire Russell and W. M. S. Russell, Human Behavior&mdash;A New
Approach
Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Pp. 532.
PETER M. DRIVER
Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan
The study of human conflict seems to
labor under three major difficulties: the dis-
like of the majority of people for viewing
man in his evolutionary perspective; the
tendency of any specialist to consider his
own speciality as more relevant than any
other applied to a problem of common in-
terest ; and the universal stumbling-block of
man’s sheer lack of ability to deal success-
fully with his social problems at the com-
munity level. All of the four books under
review at least manage to avoid the first
difficulty, and one of them brings powerful
argument to play upon the other two.
These four books have already had con-
siderable impact. Those of Ardrey and that
of Lorenz are best-sellers, and the Russells’
book had an enthusiastic reception among
the members of that small ingroup of biolo-
gists and humanists forming a tenuous bridge
between the &dquo;two cultures.&dquo; When taken
together-though such a mixture is very
strong medicine-they indicate a significant
(albeit controversial) development in the
study of man as an organism, that is, as an
animal which has evolved, like other ani-
mals, by mechanisms of natural selection.
Unfortunately, unlike other animals, man
now seems to be developing characteristics
of &dquo;unnatural&dquo; selection which give concern
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to many people, including the authors of
these books and of this review. Certainly,
no other animal exhibits anything like the
degree of intraspecific killing and maiming
shown by our own species. Whether any of
the extinct animals owed their extinction to
this kind of behavioral breakdown we shall
probably never know, but what we must be
clear about is that it is a behavioral break-
down-a biological malfunction-and that
the behavioral biologist-the ethologist-is
particularly fitted to study it.
Ethology, as I have indicated, and as
Lorenz himself (1965) has stated, may be
regarded as the biology of behavior. This
description, however, needs clarification.
Anyone studying the behavior of organisms
is studying biological phenomena, yet many
students of behavior-psychologists, sociol-
ogists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and
so on-have little or only partial biological
training. The ethologist has the distinction
of being properly qualified, without obvious
limits, for the study of his subject; he has
training both in biological science and in
behavioral observation and analysis. The
ethologist tends to be a student of the whole
animal which, strictly speaking, is the nor-
mal animal in its natural environment. To
be a &dquo;pure&dquo; ethologist is obviously, there-
fore, very difficult, and most ethologists
compromise to some degree by putting
some kind of restriction upon their animals.
This need not, however, result in significant
distortion of the animal’s behavior, and the
ethological approach to behavior would
seem to be the most objective and poten-
tially valuable of the behavioral sciences.
It should be mentioned that ethology is
not just another &dquo;ism&dquo; among the plethora
of recently-emerged subdisciplines of nat-
ural science. Although the term &dquo;ethology&dquo;
-in its present sense-was first used in
English by W. M. Wheeler as recently as
1902, the history of ethology as a rigorous
discipline of objective observation of be-
havior is a much longer one. Charles Dar-
win, of course, included an understanding
of ethological principles in his battery of
biological techniques. Nora Barlow, Dar-
win’s granddaughter and authority on his
writings, has pointed out in a personal com-
munication that in his work on barnacles,
which predated The Origin of Species, he
was all the time &dquo;thinking of behavior, ex-
actly how the animal lives, and its needs.&dquo;
The same can be seen in his Journal of 
Researches (1839). More strictly ethological
were the studies on &dquo;instinct&dquo; carried out
by Douglas Spalding (Haldane, 1954), a
contemporary of Darwin and, briefly, tutor
to Bertrand Russell. But such studies-and
there were many others-were only a nat-
ural development of the British tradition of
the scientific study of natural history, first
clearly revealed in Gilbert White’s classic,
The Natural History of Selbourne ( 1789 ) .
White was the first to make a clear dis-
tinction between the three common British
species of leaf-warbler-and did it on the
basis of their behavior. And his distinction
is as valid today as it ever was.
The work of Lorenz, of Ardrey, and of
the Russells represents the natural develop-
ment of the earlier naturalists’ approach to
animal behavior, only now it is scientific,
with a rigorous methodology and standards
of quality equivalent to those of any other
scientific discipline. At the same time it
must be noted that the work of Lorenz and
of Ardrey attracts a good deal of fierce crit-
icism from mathematically-oriented ethol-
ogists and psychologists. Such critics seem
to feel that the Lorenzian type of ethology
is unscientific, apparently because much of
the data it collects cannot be subjected to
the processes of mathematical analysis found
to be useful in other types of behavior
study. I believe that this criticism may be
an unwise one. As Slobodkin (1965) has
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pointed out, every empirical science has to
develop its own standards of quality, and
&dquo;to insist on the theory of biology conform-
ing to aesthetic standards derived from
extant mathematics is illegitimate and is, in
fact, an imposition of metaphysical criteria
on the empirical world.&dquo; While all students
of behavior must beware of &dquo;intellectual
exercise carried out in the dark void of con-
temporary ignorance of cerebral functions&dquo;
(Walshe, 1957), the ethologist working with
animals under relatively natural conditions
can be confident that his activities will in-
troduce a minimum of undetectable vari-
ables into his experiments. It is in this light
that the books here under review should
be considered.
On Aggression, written by one of the
leading biologists and the most celebrated
ethologist of our time, has been reviewed
by a number of eminent people from several
fields. The variety of response to the book
is of interest in itself, and though it cannot
be considered here in detail, it is worth
noting that those who approve are largely
experts in other fields. These include Alsop
(1966), Gorer (1966), Koestler (1966),
and Mead (1966). Those against-all work-
ing somewhere in the field of animal be-
havior-are, principally, Barnett (1967),
Schneirla (1966), and Zuckerman (1966).
I believe that this antagonism from other
behavioral scientists is only partly explained
by Lorenz’ tendency to make broad sweep-
ing assertions, e.g., &dquo;I am honestly con-
vinced that in the near future very many
men-indeed perhaps the majority of man-
kind-will regard as obvious and banal
truth all that I have written in this book
about intra-specific aggression and the
dangers which its perversion entails for
humanity.&dquo;
It may have been unwise for Lorenz to
allow this statement to be printed on the
dust-jacket of the book, but even so it should
not prejudice the reader against everything
he says. Anyone who has seen Lorenz at
work will know that he is very rigorous in-
deed, and can predict more accurately than
the majority of people what an animal will
do next. He clearly has a fingerspitzengefiihl
-one of his favorite words, meaning
roughly, &dquo;fingertip sensitivity&dquo;-for animal
behavior study, and a fertile and broadly-
integrated mind. The Russells’ book pro-
vides evidence to suggest that certain kinds
of regressive thought process, notably ra-
tionalization, in the sense used by Freud,
common to all of us-though to varying
degrees-are antipathetic to the broad ap-
proach, and may be operative in the nega-
tive reactions to Lorenz’s work.
On Aggression is a book which must be
taken very seriously, as it provides a power-
ful thesis to explain the behavioral break-
down which has resulted in the deaths of
more than sixty million humans since 1820
as a result of internecine strife. Basically
this thesis is that aggression in the proper
sense of the word is intraspecific aggression,
and normally fulfills a species-preserving
function. The fantastic aggression we see
in humans today is aggression gone wrong,
out of hand, and now resembling in its re-
sults the predator/prey combats in which
the predator’s behavior has been evolved
for the purpose of killing the prey. Intra-
specific aggression is normally (that is, in
most or all animals other than man) only
superficially similar to predator behavior,
which is both business and pleasure-
hunting, not war. &dquo;The buffalo which the
lion fells provokes his aggression as little
as the appetizing turkey which I have just
seen hanging in the larder provokes mine.
The difference in these inner drives can
clearly be seen in the expression movements
1 For further information see Letters, Scien-
tific American, May 1967, and Driver, 1967.
364
of the animal: a dog about to catch a
hunted rabbit has the same kind of excitedly
happy expression as he has when he greets
his master or awaits some longed-for treat.
From many excellent photographs it can
be seen that the lion, in the dramatic mo-
ment before he springs, is in no way angry.
Growling, laying back the ears, and other
well-known expression movements of fight-
ing behavior are seen in predatory animals
only when they are afraid of a wildly re-
sisting prey, and even then the expressions
are only suggested.&dquo; Lorenz could quite
well have made his statements in behavioral
jargon rather than widely intelligible prose,
and this would perhaps reduce some of the
negative criticism. But it has been well-
stated that the truly great scientist has no
need of jargon; fundamental truths are
self-evident when stated simply. It is the
mediocre scientist who takes refuge in
cryptic clouds of technical verbiage.
The difference between interspecific and
intraspecific aggression, as Lorenz points
out, is that intraspecific aggression is usually
ritualized; that is, though superficially like
mortal combat, it has certain characteristics
of exaggeration of action and emancipation
from its original occurrence (in a predator/
prey context), so that the actor’s perform-
ance is instinctively recognized by the re-
actor as being something qualitatively dif-
ferent from a mortal threat. And there are
the built-in insurances of submission pos-
tures and associated inhibitions for the oc-
casions when, in social animals such as
dogs, one individual is in real trouble in
an intraspecific contest. The gesture of
turning away the jaws (and offering the
side of the neck, with its thinly covered
jugular vein) is instinctively performed, as
is the cessation of attack on the part of the
dominant combatant.
It is, of course, much easier to see the
survival value of interspecific combat than
that of intraspecific aggression. If the latter
is a fundamental characteristic of animal
organization, then we must be able to pos-
tulate a selection pressure strong enough
for it to be widely incorporated in behavior
repertoires. Lorenz deals with this problem
convincingly and in a manner that is, bio-
logically, perfectly respectable: &dquo;The dan-
ger of too dense a population of an animal
species settling in one part of the available
biotope and exhausting all its sources of
nutrition and so starving can be obviated
by a mutual repulsion acting on the animals
of the same species, effecting their regular
spacing out, in much the same manner as
electrical charges are regularly distributed
all over the surface of a spherical conductor.
This, in plain terms, is the most important
survival value of intraspecific aggression.&dquo;
And again: &dquo;Unless the special interests of
a social organization demand close aggre-
gation of its members, it is obviously most
expedient to spread the individuals of an
animal species as evenly as possible over
the available habitat. To use a human
analogy: if, in a certain area, a larger num-
ber of doctors, builders, and mechanics
want to exist, the representatives of these
professions will do well to settle as far away
from each other as possible.&dquo; This is now
one of the well-established facts of life and
Lorenz documents it well, including his
own careful observations of the multitude
of highly varied species of coral reef fish
of the Florida Keys.
He also provides broad and compelling
documentation of what he calls &dquo;behavioral
analogies to morality,&dquo; including the sub-
mission postures and inhibitions already
mentioned. Now comes a crucial question:
Why does man not have such instinctive
inhibitions? Lorenz’s answer, with which I
agree, is that in human evolution no
such inhibitory mechanisms were necessary;
quick killing was impossible and a potential
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victim had time to bring other methods of
avoidance or appeasement into play. &dquo;No
selection pressure arose in the prehistory of
mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms
preventing the killing of conspecifics until,
all of a sudden, the invention of artificial
weapons upset the equilibrium of killing
potential and social inhibitions.&dquo; Man then
was in an analogous position to that of
harmless animals like doves which, when
under closely confined conditions, will fight
to such an extent that the weaker ones are
killed slowly and with great suffering.
Similarly, as man’s environment becomes
more artificial and confined, so his aggres-
sion becomes more harmful. It can be no
accident that the most humane peoples are
some of the more isolated groups of Es-
kimos, the Arapesh of New Guinea, the
Lepchas of Sikkim, the Ituri of the Congo,
and some other technologically &dquo;backward&dquo;
and isolated tribes (Gorer, 1966).
Another major problem Lorenz deals with
by evolutionary analogy is the human &dquo;rat-
race.&dquo; He quotes his mentor, Oskar Hein-
roth, who used to say, &dquo;Next to the wings
of the Argus pheasant, the hectic life of
Western civilized man is the most stupid
product of intraspecific selectionl&dquo; The hen
Argus pheasant is particularly attracted to
the huge wing feathers of the cock, which
are decorated with beautiful eye spots.
Lorenz notes: &dquo;The number of progeny
produced by a cock in a certain period of
time is in direct proportion to the length
of these feathers, and, even if their extreme
development is unfavorable in other ways
-his unwieldiness may cause him to be
eaten by a predator while a rival with less
absurdly exaggerated wings may escape-
he will nevertheless leave more descendants
than will a plainer cock .... the evolution
of the Argus pheasant has run itself into a
blind alley.&dquo; He compares this with the
human state: &dquo;The rushed existence into
which industrialized, commercialized man
has precipitated himself is actually a good
example of an inexpedient development
caused entirely by competition between
members of the same species. Human
beings of today are attacked by the so-
called manager diseases, high blood pres-
sure, renal atrophy, gastric ulcers, and tor-
turing neuroses; they succumb to barbarism
because they have no time for cultural in-
terests. And all this is unnecessary, for they
could easily agree to take things more easily;
theoretically they could, but in practice it
is just as impossible for them as it is for
the Argus pheasant to grow shorter wing
feathers.&dquo;
I have quoted enough, I think, to indi-
cate Lorenz’ style and &dquo;message.&dquo; What I
want to stress is that his comments are based
on a very broad, and in many cases deep,
knowledge of the animals and the types of
behavior he discusses. And he is a scholar,
in the best sense of the word. Add to this
his respect for the teaching of Charles Dar-
win, and his conviction that &dquo;Unless one
understands the elements of a complete
system as a whole, one cannot understand
them at all,&dquo; and one has an idea of how
important his teaching-if he is right-
must be.
It is, of course, one thing to recognize
a problem such as that of human aggres-
sion, and another to suggest methods of
alleviating that problem. But here, too,
Lorenz makes some powerful suggestions.
Few people will disagree with his first sug-
gestion : the old &dquo;Know thyself.&dquo; And the
ethological approach would seem to have
much to offer here. His second suggestion
is the psychoanalytic study of &dquo;sublimation&dquo;
or redirection as a means of controlling
aggression. Certainly there are plenty of
examples from other species of intraspecific
aggression being reduced by &dquo;redirected&dquo;
activities. And psychoanalysis would seem
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to show that &dquo;many patterns of altogether
laudable behavior derive their impulses from
the ’sublimation’ of aggressive or sexual
drives.&dquo; The third suggestion is fairly obvi-
ous but &dquo;still worth mentioning: it is the
promotion of personal acquaintance and,
if possible, friendship between individual
members of different ideologies or nations.&dquo;
Lorenz indicates how this may have bene-
ficial results which would not necessarily
be expected. The fourth measure suggested
is &dquo;the intelligent and responsible channel-
ing of militant enthusiasm, in other words
helping a younger generation which, on the
one hand, is highly critical and even sus-
picious, and, on the other, emotionally
starved, to find genuine causes that are
worth serving in the modern world.&dquo; And
this, of course, is just what voluntary service
organizations are attempting in various parts
of the world. If Lorenz is right there may
be more value in such service than has been
hoped for.
The most significant of the vast field
of evolutionary and behavioral phenomena
covered by Lorenz in his book are con-
sidered in more detail by Ardrey and by the
Russells, and their books lend considerable
weight to his conclusions. Ardrey is not, by
training, a biologist, yet he has a distinct
knack for surveying biological topics in
such a way that he not only recognizes the
fundamentally important works and workers,
but also discovers and integrates important
matters that have hitherto been overlooked.
A hundred years ago he would probably
have rescued Mendel’s work from obscurity
well in advance of its actual discovery. But
Ardrey’s books are-to many biologists-
peculiarly frustrating. Many of his deduc-
tions seem to be sound, but, possibly be-
cause he is not well-enough versed in evo-
lutionary science, he spreads his net too
widely in his enthusiasm for evidence which
supports his ideas, and the mesh is too fine.
Yet he writes with such clarity, style, and
excitement, and is, on the whole, so percep-
tive, that one is carried along with him in
spite of his occasional deviations from the
straight and narrow. After all, if a theory
is founded on data some of which are found
to be unsound, this need not discount the
rest of the data, or the theory.
African Genesis is subtitled &dquo;A Personal
Investigation into the Animal Origins and
Nature of Man.&dquo; During this investigation,
as the book jacket tells us, &dquo;For six years
Mr. Ardrey commuted between the mu-
seums and libraries and laboratories of the
North, and the game reserves and fossil
beds of Africa. Most of the information he
sought was known only to the most ad-
vanced scientific specialists and to workers
in the field. His investigations spread out
beyond the simple though terrible question
concerning man’s affinity for war and
weapons. It came to include many an in-
stitution and persuasion regarded as ex-
clusively human: nationalism and patriotism,
private property and social order, hierarchy
and status-seeking, even conscience. All re-
vealed roots in our most ancient animal be-
ginning and parallels in primate societies.&dquo;
This is not only an accurate indication of
what the reader may expect from the book
-and in this the publishers are to be con-
gratulated-but it also points to the under-
lying dictum of all these books: given the
undeniable fact that our structure has
evolved from that of preexisting species, we
must assume that our behavior has also, and
that our structure or behavior can therefore
be evaluated in the light of the structure
and behavior of our closest evolutionary
relatives.2 This is simply a reflection of what
Ardrey quite properly calls &dquo;the contem-
2 Further discussion of this and other related
topics may be found in Driver (1967) and
Thorpe (1966).
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porary revolution in the natural sciences,&dquo;
the vast leap forward in our understanding
of animal behavior and of our link to the
animal world. Yet, as he points out, this
revolution &dquo;has proceeded in something
more striking than silence. It has proceeded
in secret. Like our tiny, furry, squirrel-like,
earliest primate ancestors, seventy million
years ago, the revolution has found obscur-
ity its best defense and modesty the key
to its survival. For it has challenged larger
orthodoxies than just those of science, and
its enemies exist beyond counting.&dquo;
What has held back this revolutionary
information? This is a problem-and a very
serious one-which is partially explained
in the Russells’ book. Also, as Ardrey notes,
&dquo;A certain justification has existed until
now ... for the submission of the insurgent
specialists to the censorship of scientific
orthodoxy. Such higher bastions of philo-
sophical orthodoxy as Jefferson, Marx, and
Freud could scarcely be stormed by partial
regiments.&dquo; But then, in 1961, when African
Genesis was first published, the &dquo;over-
whelming body of incontrovertible proof&dquo;
for man’s animal origin, which Ardrey con-
sidered a prerequisite for action, was avail-
able, and he immediately began on his sec-
ond book, which enlarges one particularly
important aspect of the first. And slowly,
much too slowly for some of us-for there
is need for haste-the real facts of life and
of death are being communicated; here by
an enthusiastic teacher, there by a best-
selling book, here by experimental evidence,
there by generalizations acceptable to a
wide range of specialists (so long as they
have not been blinded by the new medie-
valism which restricts the laws of nature
to those of physics, chemistry, and mathe-
matics ).
It has been to Ardrey’s-and our-ad-
vantage that he is a generalist. &dquo;I have
listened to geologists, ecologists, and zoolo-
gists in America; anthropologists, palaeon-
tologists, and meteorologists in London;
archaeologists, anatomists, and biologists in
South Africa; primate specialists in Central
Africa, reptile specialists in California and
the Transvaal, mammal specialists in Pre-
toria and Nairobi, game wardens in the vast
reserves of Uganda, and the Congo, South
Africa and Kenya.&dquo; It is remarkable that
he has managed to integrate such a wide
range of information so acceptably to so
many specialists. Not that he is without
critics: he annoys most of us in one way or
another; but the likelihood of his observa-
tions being largely correct is high. The
validity of his conclusions may be another
matter.
African Genesis is concerned with two
major themes: the concept of territory, de-
veloped more fully in Ardrey’s second book,
and the evidence for man having arisen
from a killer prehominid. The information
he provides on territory and associated mat-
ters such as the &dquo;pecking order&dquo; and other
kinds of hierarchy is, on the whole, fairly
sound. Ardrey has talked to the right peo-
ple and read the things he should have read.
But one gets a recurring feeling of annoy-
ance when he reveals that, although he is
a convert to the field of ethology, he is
ethologically naive. He seems to find the
contemporary revolution so overwhelmingly
exciting that he forgets the necessity for
keeping the emotions rigorously under con-
trol so that they do not run away with the
intellect and use it to rationalize an emo-
tional bias. But I cavil too much. For the
account of the contemporary revolution
alone this is a very important book. It is
also of great importance for the light Ardrey
sheds on the various controversies concern-
ing man’s immediate ancestors.
Some 800,000 years ago there lived,
around the edge of Africa’s Lake Victoria,
a small, advanced, man-like ape, Austra-
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lopithecus africanus. Ardrey gives much
detail of the work of Raymond Dart, who
discovered this controversial creature in
1924. The controversy centers on Dart’s
belief that A. africanus used weapons, cer-
tainly for hunting, and probably for fighting
his fellows, and although the controversy
continues, the evidence which Ardrey pre-
sents in support of Dart’s belief is over-
whelming. And it must be recorded that
in this context Ardrey seems to be rigorous
in his assessment of the evidence.
Indeed, it is difficult to see why there
has been so much resistance to the sugges-
tion that this prehominid used weapons-
the distal end of the humerus of a medium-
sized antelope as a club, and the lower jaw
of a small antelope for slashing-unless, as
Ardrey suggests, the reaction is a psycho-
logical one. It could well be due to the
romantic fallacy that &dquo;all human behavior,
with certain stated exceptions, results from
causes lying within the human experience.&dquo;
Thus the majority of anthropologists may
have rejected the suggestion that a possible
forebear of man was a killer because this
would imply that man was bom a killer.
Yet there is an increasing amount of evi-
dence to indicate that this reaction is il-
logical. We know that the California sea
otter holds a stone on its chest to use as
an anvil for the breaking open of clam shells
(Hall and Schaller, 1964); chimpanzees use
sticks as tools, and throw sticks, stones, and
vegetation in both playful and aggressive
encounters (Goodhall, 1964); the wood-
pecker finch of the Galapagos uses a cactus
spine for poking insects out of tree bark
(Lack, 1947); and Egyptian vultures throw
stones at ostrich eggs to break them open,
and then devour the contents (the van
Lawick-Goodhalls, 1966). Surely we can-
not deny to a man-like ape what would be
only a minor variation of such behavior?
We must agree with Ardrey’s support of
Dart in this.
But I do not agree with Ardrey’s assump-
tion that man therefore was born a killer.
We do not know that A. africanus was on
the direct line of human evolution, and if
he was it would have been a very unusual
example of selection that would develop a
weapon suitable for killing conspecifics
without the built-in safeguards evolved by
all other well-armed animals. For the mo-
ment, Lorenz’s assessment seems the more
accurate: we became human before we had
weapons with which we could kill our fel-
lows.
In The Territorial Imperative, subtitled
&dquo;A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins
of Property and Nations,&dquo; Ardrey shows an
interesting maturity of biological scholar-
ship. Not only is he impressive in his cov-
erage of the field but he also shows an
increasing understanding of evolutionary
phenomena. Anyone could profit from read-
ing this book, which Ardrey dedicates fit-
tingly to H. Eliot Howard who, in 1920,
published his Territory in Bird Life. This
was, &dquo;until this present volume, the only
book devoted solely to the innate relation-
ship between property and inanimate be-
havior.&dquo;
From Eliot Howard, Ardrey threads his
way competently through the maze of litera-
ture on territory, and the complex behavioral
phenomena associated with it, up to the
contemporary and controversial On Aggres-
sion and V. C. Wynne-Edwards’ Animal
Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour
( 1962 ) . He first deals with instinct, and I
thank him for pointing out the inadequacy
of a phrase which has long annoyed me
that of Ashley Montagu (1962) to the effect
that &dquo;man has lost virtually all of his in-
stincts.&dquo;
He then deals with various aspects of
territorial behavior, integrating the infor-
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mation we have on the maintenance of ter-
ritorial boundaries, the displays associated
with this, the various kinds of territories
which may be seen in the animal kingdom,
and the function of territory both as a place
to breed and an area from which food can
be gathered, and as a means of dispersing
the individuals of a population over the
available habitat so that there is optimum
benefit for the population as a whole. This
means that, in some species, under certain
conditions, a number of individuals will not
breed. But it is the population which is
served in such cases, not the individual,
and here we may have the evolutionary be-
ginnings of what we know as altruism in
man. This is not the place to consider the
various theories of territory-anyone inter-
ested should read the book. But it is the
place to reiterate the underlying conviction
of all these books that the key to the future
lies in our evolutionary past. As Ardrey puts
it, &dquo;The continuity of human evolution from
the world of the animal to the world of man
ensures that a human group in possession
of a territory will behave according to the
universal laws of the territorial principle.
What we call patriotism, in other words, is
a calculable force which, released by a pre-
dictable situation, will animate man in a
manner no different from other territorial
species.&dquo; There can be no doubt that this
is basically true. Just as a territory-owning
stickleback or herring gull will fight its
neighbors more fiercely the farther they ven-
ture into its territory, so does a football
team fight the more courageously the nearer
to its line it is pressed, and the academic
more jealously protect his inner office than
his institution. The football team is illus-
trating territorial defense, and the academic
the use of territory as a place where one
has minimal competition with others.
So far I have indicated that the value of
Ardrey’s work lies in his integration of
important facts, and his belief in the under-
lying importance of evolutionary mecha-
nisms. Now I am pleased to point out what
may be a lasting contribution to science:
his descriptive analysis of the kinds of social
organization which he calls the &dquo;noyau&dquo;
and the &dquo;nation.&dquo;
The term &dquo;noyau&dquo; is taken from the
French ethologist Jean-Jacques Petter (1962)
&dquo;as a label for the society of inward an-
tagonism,&dquo; and implies &dquo;a primitive evolu-
tionary step towards societies characterized
by mutual aid.&dquo; On the island of Mada-
gascar live thirty-odd species of lemurs-
presimian primates-which provide the bi-
ologist with a tantalizing store of evolu-
tionary information. Most of the species
are diurnal and have normal societies of
mutual aid and cooperation, but the noc-
turnal &dquo;sportive lemur&dquo; is interestingly dif-
ferent. This species &dquo;defends a territory of
no more than sixty or so yards in diameter.
A little society of six or so may crowd itself
into an area as small as an acre, where it
will live in perfect recrimination.&dquo; And yet
there will be no others of the species for
miles around. Why do they stay together?
The answer, of course, is a complex one,
but it will certainly be connected with the
previous observation of James Fisher (1954)
who wrote that the effect of this kind of
behavior &dquo;is to create ’neighborhoods’ of
individuals who while masters of their own
definite and limited properties are bound
firmly and socially to their next-door neigh-
bors by what in human terms would be
described as a dear-enemy or rival-friend
situation, but which in bird terms should
more safely be described as mutual stimu-
lation.&dquo; This is reminiscent of Wynne-
Edwards’ &dquo;brotherhood of tempered ri-
valry.&dquo;
The biological &dquo;nation,&dquo; as Ardrey de-
fines it, is &dquo;a social group containing at
least two mature males which holds as an
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exclusive possession a continuous area of
space, which isolates itself from others of
its kind through outward antagonism, and
which through joint defense of its social
territory achieves leadership, cooperation,
and a capacity for concerted action.&dquo; It
matters not whether such a nation be com-
posed of a few or of many individuals, or
whether we consider true lemurs, howler
monkeys, Bushman bands, Greek city states,
or modern human nations. The social prin-
ciple seems to be the same.
As Ardrey sees it, Italy, with its com-
munal noise, argument, and general strife,
is a noyau. Britain, with its general calm
-natural or inhibited-is a nation. There
is much to be said for, and against, both.
What is important here is that two major
kinds of human social organization seem to
have been mapped out more than fifty
million years ago, when the older noyau-
type lemurs produced nation-type offshoots.
How near the truth was the Chinese saying,
&dquo;There is all animal in man, though there
is not all man in the animal!&dquo;
In my first paragraph I noted that the
operations of specialists can be a stumbling-
block to progress: &dquo;... no specialist is
entitled to observe or interpret anything
that might seem the province-or territory!
-of another specialist. Ultimately this is
traceable to a craving for dominance hier-
archies.&dquo; This is a quotation, not from
Ardrey, but from the Russells’ book. Human
Behavior-A New Approach is so encyclo-
pedic in content and so erudite in presen-
tation that one hesitates even to attempt to
deal with it in less than full review. How-
ever, it does knit extremely well with the
other books here reviewed, the four to-
gether showing how ethology can be ap-
plied to the fundamental problems of life
with a potential of success perhaps un-
equalled by any other discipline. Like
Ardrey, the Russells show due regard to
the work of Lorenz as an outstanding scien-
tist. Also like Ardrey, they acknowledge
our debt to Niko Tinbergen, who has done
more for ethology than anyone but Lorenz.
His publications of 1951, 1953, and 1965
show the scope of both his mind and his
subject.
The Russells bring an impressive battery
of qualifications to bear upon the study of
human behavior. Claire Russell is a psy-
chiatrist of great experience, and W. M. S.
Russell, who has also practiced as a psy-
chiatrist, began his career with scholarships
in Greek and in classics and English litera-
ture at Oxford before becoming a success-
ful zoologist and writer. He has published
widely in ethology, and his Evolutionary
Concepts in Behavioral Science ( 1958,
1959, 1961) is definitive. The Russells’
background means that they have had ac-
cess to animal and human behavior in the
laboratory and consulting room, and in the
vast collection of behavioral description
contained in classical and contemporary
literature. They have used their opportu-
nities well.
The value of the Russells’ contribution is
threefold. First, they demonstrate the evo-
lutionary origins of human behavior in ways
which complement and supplement the
writings of Ardrey and Lorenz. Secondly,
they show how the approaches of ethology
and psychiatry can be used together in the
analysis of human behavior, both in life
and in literature. And thirdly, they make a
biological investigation of those behavioral
qualities which we do not share with the
other animals-&dquo;that capability and god-like
reason,&dquo; as Hamlet called it, or what is
widely but loosely referred to as &dquo;intelli-
gence.&dquo; It is this third section of the book
which is most important for our present
context.
As the Russells point out, the widely-
accepted IQ tests, whatever their sophisti-
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cation, do not deal successfully with that
specifically human capability which sepa-
rates us behaviorally from our evolutionary
ancestors. It is perhaps not generally real-
ized that a person’s score in certain standard
IQ tests is almost completely unaffected by
cutting off the oxygen supply to the brain
for a considerable period (Halstead, 1947)
or by removal of both frontal lobes of the
brain or of any other lobe on one side
(Hebb, 1942; Halstead, 1947). These tests
thus indicate that a person with up to a
third of the cerebrum missing-even the
frontal cortex which is the most specifically
human part of the brain-is as intelligent
as when the brain is intact. Clearly, such
tests are inaccurate indicators of &dquo;intelli-
gence&dquo; if we assume brain structure and
function to have evolved together.
The first biological approach to the prob-
lem of intelligence was made by Ward
Halstead (1947), who set out to measure
the activities of the brain as a progressive
evolutionary machine. As he has said else-
where (1951), &dquo;Man’s strategic position in
the animal kingdom derives in part at least
from the unusual range and quality of the
perceptions of which he is capable, from
his capacity for controlled adaptability, and
from the degrees of freedom through which
orientation can be achieved and main-
tained.&dquo; The Russells point out that this
constant ability to rearrange and reorganize
is a fundamental of an evolutionary machine
= ‘An evolutionary machine is made up of
a very large number of component units,
richly interconnected, the relations between
which are not predetermined. As various
inputs impinge upon the machine, the small
units become linked together into larger
transient combinations, which shift and
merge in kaleidoscopic fashion, like political
parties in the parliamentary assemblies of
some modem countries. The question may
therefore arise, which of these transient
functional groupings will survive as larger
single components and this may depend on
a process of selection. The process is thus
comparable with the natural selection of
successful organisms and species in the
grand procession of organic evolution, and
we can apply to events in the individual
brain all the principles observed on that
more spacious stage.&dquo; I think this evolu-
tionary point is well taken, and I shall refer
to it again.
Halstead’s technique was to apply a
battery of tests designed with the evolu-
tionary concept in mind to a wide range of
subjects, including patients with brain le-
sions as well as normal individuals, and
then to submit the mass of resulting data
to factor analysts. These experts postulated
the operation of four factors for the produc-
tion of the results they were given. Further
investigation of these factors (e.g., Reitan,
1956) indicates not only what kind of ability
they subserve, but also their connection
with the most recently evolved part of the
human brain-the cortex of the prefrontal
lobes.
The Russells have named Halstead’s fac-
tors abstraction, integration, specific expres-
sion, and exploratory drive. These names
reflect the modes of behavior which appear
to be the overt expression of the four in-
telligence factors, and together they indicate
the structure of biological intelligence. If
biological intelligence is-as I believe-true
intelligence, then it behooves us to take due
note of its structure and function, and study
the causes and results of its breakdown.
Herein lies the major contribution of this
book.
The abstraction factor involves the ability
to recognize a unit in a mass, as when we
note a black sheep in a flock, or a different
behavioral or chemical reaction from those
to which we are accustomed. It enables us
to discriminate among a large number of
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objects, people, or situations; to see the
individual in a crowd, and the wood as
well as the trees. Lorenz has remarked that
this is just what we mean by &dquo;intuition&dquo;-
literally being able to &dquo;see into&dquo; a situation.
The integration factor is probably the
most important factor of biological intelli-
gence, being the most specifically human
factor of the four. In fact, if it is as impor-
tant as the Russells’ evidence suggests, it
may be the skeleton key to unlock the doors
to individual fulfillment, group achievement,
and, in the long run, human survival. It
would seem to be a progressive evolutionary
machine par excellence.
Integration involves the assessment of
units of information brought in by abstrac-
tion. It &dquo;permits new data to be compared
with old, and thus makes it possible to
qualify a generalization.&dquo; The more efficient
the operation of the integration factor, the
greater the understanding of information
received. &dquo;Integration is the organized but
flexible growth of the individual’s experi-
ence ; a growth like that of ’poetry’ which,
as T. S. Eliot once pointed out, changes its
whole nature every time a new poem is
written. It hinges on a complete availability
of all data, old and new, for comparison
with each other and rearrangement in ever
more realistic groupings.&dquo; A high level of
integration must be strongly connected with
having an open mind-&dquo;indeed the phrase
is peculiarly appropriate, implying as it does
both receptiveness to new ideas and an
open system of communications within.&dquo; It
is also connected with a sense of humor
which, &dquo;as has often been said, is a sense
of the incongruous. It requires a capacity
to put two ideas in juxtaposition-especially
two of one’s own ideas, or one’s own preach-
ing and one’s own practice-and see how
absurdly they clash. The sense of humor
is a sort of feedback report on the state
of integration of our experience, or that of
our society.&dquo; Primed with this indispens-
able report, we can proceed, in the words
of Dr. Johnson, &dquo;to clear our minds of cant.&dquo;
The specific expression factor is easily
recognized. Terms describing it are in
everyday use: &dquo;green fingers,&dquo; &dquo;a greasy
thumb,&dquo; &dquo;the gift of the gab,&dquo; &dquo;a light hand
with pastry.&dquo; The overt expression of in-
telligence always involves the use of some
particular skill or skills, this varying con-
siderably from one person to another. A
high degree of specific expression is equiva-
lent to what is usually called &dquo;flair&dquo; or
&dquo;talent,&dquo; while high degrees of abstraction
and integration produce genius. The in-
telligence factors vary independently, doubt-
less under the influence of both heredity
and upbringing, the result of which is that
one may encounter a genius with little
talent, or someone with a definite flair but
low general intelligence.
Exploratory drive brings us new informa-
tion for abstraction and integration. When
very highly developed, this factor produces
the eminent explorer-geographical, scien-
tific, artistic, or whatever; but all the time
it is that which keeps us aware of our im-
mediate environment. And to explore is to
tolerate uncertainty; to be aware that the
current situation may change. This is im-
portant in all human endeavor: &dquo;The gift
that makes the supreme explorer, the scien-
tist or artist, is not the capacity to frame
a hypothesis or a mode of expression, but
the capacity resolutely to scrap them and
start again-not, of course, really from
scratch, for a good scientific hypothesis is
always integrated into its successor as a
special case, and an artist makes fresh use
of the devices he has discarded as such.&dquo;
The intelligence factors, of course, form
an intimately linked system. &dquo;In setting up
our internal models, abstraction is important,
and in permitting their free interplay inte-
gration is vital. The exploratory drive pro-
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vides a ceaseless influx of new variability,
which is filtered and organized into mean-
ingful patterns by the other factors.&dquo;
Now why is all this so important? The
answer is a simple one. If the Russells are
right-and I believe they are-biological
intelligence is the most highly developed
manifestation of the general evolutionary
process of adaptive modification by infor-
mation feedback (Russell, 1961, has called
this &dquo;combinatorial selection&dquo;). This in-
volves the development of numerous vari-
ations in the population, whether it be a
population of genes or of organisms, and
the feeding back of useful variations into
the basic pool-which thus benefits as a
whole by the experience of individual mem-
bers. Clearly, a process of integration is
essential to this procedure and when it
breaks down the consequences may be seri-
ous. When a species, for example, becomes
so specialized that it cannot adapt to chang-
ing circumstances, then change will be
harmful. Similarly, when the free flow of
information in the intelligence system is
interfered with by deficiencies in the inter-
nal or external environment, the individual
shows proportionally irrational, automatic,
and nonadaptive behavior. The result is
varying degrees of isolation, rigidity, stereo-
typy, and compulsiveness-the exact oppo-
sites of the free information flow, flexibility,
versatility, and freedom of choice seen in
biological intelligence. I believe that these
malfunctions have been at least partially
operative in the negative reactions to Dar-
win and to Lorenz; in the delay of what
Ardrey calls &dquo;the contemporary revolution&dquo;
in natural science; and in the schisms of the
&dquo;two cultures.&dquo; And they are as common in
Academe as elsewhere.
The potential contribution of ethology to
the problem of human conflict is thus clear.
By acceptance of the basic facts of life
those of evolution-ethological techniques
clear the way for a true understanding of
the behavior of animals, including man. By
integrating with other natural sciences, par-
ticularly neurophysiology and psychology,
ethology can speed the analysis of the more
significant behavioral processes such as
biological intelligence. And by an etho-
logical study of the breakdown of these
processes we may be able to correct the
mistakes of the present and avoid making
so many in the future. The four books here
reviewed give a composite picture of this
potential. If their message is jammed by
too much &dquo;noise&dquo; in the system, we may as
well fall back on that supreme rationaliza-
tion of Thurber’s bad Duke: &dquo;We all have
faults; mine is being wicked.&dquo;
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